
























CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1089 
CATEGORY 6: MONETARY POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 
NOVEMBER 2003 
 
PRESENTED AT VENICE SUMMER INSTITUTE, WORKSHOP ON ECONOMIC STAGNATION IN 







An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the CESifo website:           www.CESifo.de CESifo Working Paper No. 1089 
 
 






During the past three decades, Japan’s current account experienced five large swings. The yen 
appreciated considerably in periods when the current account boomed, and it depreciated 
whenever Japan’s external performance weakened. However, there has always been a certain 
lag in the adjustment of the exchange rate. This paper tries to explain these empirical 
regularities. It argues that as a result of the large movements of the current account, the flows 
of cash between Japan and ist trading partners fluctuated considerably, which in turn 
influenced the demand for yen relative to other currencies. To the extent that these cash flows 
were lagging the current account—primarily because of the Japanese lending abroad—the 
exchange rate’s response to external imbalances occurred with a delay. Based on the 
estimated maturity structure of Japan’s foreign lending, the paper constructs a measure of 
payment flows across Japanese borders, which is shown to follow the movements of the 
exchange rate very closely. The empirical findings raise doubts regarding the feasibility of 
proposals to depreciate the yen in order to help Japan out of its current economic crisis. 
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 1 Introduction
The rise of the yen. During its rise to the world’s largest export and creditor na-
tion, Japan has witnessed a substantial appreciation of its currency, the yen. There
are many stories about the driving forces behind the Japanese exchange rate, which
often share the following characteristics: First, theories seek to explain the yen’s
real, rather than nominal, appreciation. Second, they are concerned with the yen’s
behaviour in the longer term. And third, they link the level of the exchange rate
to stock variables, such as the relative level of productivity or the stock of foreign
assets.
Take the Balassa-Samuelson effect. This theory predicts a real exchange rate
appreciation for countries who experience strong productivity growth over time
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996). Most economists consider Japan as the best example
for this theory, if not as its proof. However, the long-term appreciation of the yen
is cited, too, as empirical evidence in favour of theories that regard the net foreign
asset position as a long-term driving force behind the real exchange rate (Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti, 2000). These theories vary in their economic motivation. Some of
them focus on the relative prices of nontradable goods, others on the presence of a
home preference for domestic tradables, and again others on the impact of wealth
effects on labour supply.
The nominal exchange rate. This paper takes on a different perspective. It ar-
gues that the sum of commercial and ﬁnancial transactions across Japanese borders
over the years has resulted in a ﬂow of international payments between the country
and its trading partners, which determined the demand for yen relative to other cur-
rencies. The paper’s emphasis is on these international payment ﬂows, and on the
corresponding currency ﬂows in the foreign exchange market, which are perceived
as the driving force behind the yen’s nominal exchange rate.
Japan’s nominal and real effective exchange rates have been almost perfectly
correlated over a long span of time. The yen appreciated less in real terms than
in nominal terms over time, due to the fact that the inﬂation rates of Japan’s trad-
ing partners were always slightly above Japan’s own inﬂation rate, but the inﬂa-
tion differential has kept remarkably constant. Given that—as this paper shall
demonstrate—the demand for yen has risen substantially over the past thirty years,
it appears that the long-term real appreciation of the yen may have been caused by
its even stronger nominal counterpart, rather than vice versa.1
1For the period from 1980Q1 to 2000Q1, Japan’s annual inﬂation rate has kept 1.7% below the
weighted inﬂation rates of its trading partners on average . By contrast, Japan’s nominal effective
exchange rate rose by an annual average of 4.5% during the same period, implying a substantial real
appreciation of the yen over the years.
2International cash ﬂow. How are international payments measured? The prob-
lem is that they do not enter the published balance of payments statistics as a sep-
arate item, in Japan as little as elsewhere (Kenen, 1996). International payments
comprise changes in bank balances and other cash ﬂows and are scattered across
the portfolio balance. There is no simple way to infer their movements from the
ﬂuctuations of the portfolio balance or its subcomponents.
This paper proposes an indirect way to estimate international cash ﬂow. It fo-
cuses on Japan’s current account and its debt securities balance. Current account
transactions are in part debt-ﬁnanced. They thus induce both immediate and de-
ferred payments. To assess their relative importance, it is crucial to have an idea
about the maturity structure of net foreign debt. As this paper demonstrates, this
can be inferred from the joint evolution of the current account and the debt balance.
Once an estimate of the debt maturity structure is obtained, it becomes possible to
construct a simulated series of cash ﬂow vis-à-vis Japan and to compare it to the
movements of the Japanese exchange rate.
Plan of the paper. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 investigates
the empirical link between the current account and the exchange rate. Section 3
presents the empirical model for simulating cross-border payment ﬂows for Japan.
Section 4 considers economic implications of the previous analysis for Japan’s
current economic crisis. Section 5 provides overall conclusions.
2 Large swings in the yen
2.1 Time series evidence
Over the last half-century, the yen has been appreciating persistently, in nomi-
nal and in real terms. This development has attracted considerable attention, and
various theories for it are on offer. What has also been remarkable—and what
consequently merits an explanation as well—is that there have been massive ﬂuc-
tuations of the Japanese currency over the years. For instance, between 1985Q3
and 1988Q4, the yen’s value shot up by 61% in trade-weighted terms (39% in the
year from 1985Q3 through 1986Q3 alone). Or take the 1990s, when the yen rose
by52%from1992Q3through1995Q2, thendroppedby35%inthefollowingthree
years through 1998Q3, only to be pushed up once more by 40% in the two years
thereafter. Fluctuations of these magnitudes can be observed all the way back to

















































Figure 1: Large current account surpluses. Current account balances of countries
with large current account surpluses (in billions of US dollars). Countries are selected and
ordered according to the highest current account balance they have achieved in any single
quarter in the period from 1977Q1 to 2001Q3. Source: International Financial Statistics
(IMF).
2.1.1 Parallel ﬂuctuations
This paper argues that the large swings in the yen were primarily the result of sim-
ilarly impressive movements of the Japanese current account. Consider Figure 1,
which plots the current account balances (in US-dollar terms) of a number of coun-
tries that have, at some stage, achieved high surpluses during the past twenty-ﬁve
years. It is evident that Japan’s surplus—which mirrored the equally impressive
current account deﬁcit of the United States—has dwarfed the surpluses of all its
competitors; even Germany’s export boom of the 1980s appears modest compared
with what Japan achieved during the last two decades.
Figure 2 illustrates the link between the current account and the nominal effec-
tive exchange rate in Japan. It plots the time series of both variables over a period
of more than thirty years. As in the rest of this paper, the nominal exchange rate
is deﬁned as the foreign-currency price of the domestic currency, that is, a rise in
the nominal exchange rate implies an appreciation of the domestic currency. A
remarkable feature of the data are the recurrent swings in both of these variables.
The current account, in particular, witnessed ﬁve large upswings and downswings,
with clear turning-points. The exchange rate went through similar upward and
downward movements, which were maybe not quite as marked, but still visible. In
general, the exchange rate seems to have followed the movements of the current
account, normally with a lag of up to two years. Another way to see this is by not-
ing that it was usually in the years when the current account reached a peak that the


















Nominal effective exchange rate 
Figure 2: Japanese current account and exchange rate. Japanese current account (left
scale, in trillions of yen, transformed from biannual to quarterly frequency using a natu-
ral cubic spline smooth) and nominal effective exchange rate (right scale, in logarithms),
period from 1968Q1 to 1999Q4. Source: Economic Outlook (OECD), IFS (IMF).
exchange rate increased most strongly. This occurred in 1971–1972, 1977–1978,
1985–1986, 1992–1993 and in 1999.
This paper considers a fairly basic explanation of the observed empirical reg-
ularities. It argues that the current account has offset large and volatile ﬂows of
international payments between Japan and its trading partners, which pushed the
relative demand for yen in the foreign exchange markets up during some years and
reduced it during other years. However, Japan has continuously used the proceeds
from its external surpluses to invest abroad, thus taking pressure off the yen.
Yet it is likely that a large part of the capital outﬂows acted only as a temporary,
and thus imperfect, buffer. The most signiﬁcant part of Japan’s capital account is
the country’s debt securities balance. For instance, after the ﬁnancial liberalization
of the late 1970s and early 1980s, Japan began to invest heavily in foreign debt
securities, mainly in the United States. Such lending helped to keep the yen low, or
at least to make its appreciation less steep. However, since foreign lending tended
to be temporary, current account movements fed into the exchange rate sooner or
later.
2.1.2 Similar experiences
It is interesting to note parallel developments in other countries. In the United
States, a massive current account deﬁcit emerged in the early 1980s, while the US
dollar was strongly appreciating. It was not until 1985 that the dollar started to
5depreciate, but then the slide of the currency was dramatic. An even larger deﬁcit
developed in the latter half of the 1990s, which again did not seem to do harm the
dollar, which kept on appreciating. Yet things eventually changed in early 2002
when the dollar started to depreciate rapidly.
The story is similar in countries hit by currency crises. Often, these countries
run large current account deﬁcits prior to their crises, which are only sustained
due to large capital inﬂows. When capital inﬂows dry up, however, the national
currencies tend to get into trouble. Eichengreen (2003, chapter 8) and Bussiere and
Mulder (1999), for instance, have shown that a small set of variables—including
the current account as a percentage of GDP, export growth, international reserves
and short-term foreign debt relative to reserves—do a very good job in predicting
the EMS crisis in 1992–1993, the Mexican crisis in 1994–1995 as well as the Asian
crisis in 1997.
2.1.3 Related ﬁndings
The claims made here ﬁnd support in the evidence provided by Brooks, Edison,
Kumar and Sløk (2001), who ﬁnd that the yen exchange rate has remained closely
tied to the current account over recent years; portfolio ﬂows appear to have been
less relevant for the yen-dollar exchange rate in their view than, say, for the euro-
dollar exchange rate. Hau and Rey (2003) report that international equity ﬂows and
repatriations of dividendsappear to be highly correlated with exchangerates. How-
ever, Japan appears to be one of the few exceptions, which Hau and Rey attribute
to the higher share of bonds, as opposed to equity, in portfolio ﬂows.
The argument presented here is closely related to the traditional ﬂow market
model to exchange rate determination (which is also being referred to as balance
of payments ﬂow approach; for a review, see Mussa, 1979; Rosenberg, 1996). It
also offers an interesting macro perspective on the recent literature on exchange
rate microstructure (Evans and Lyons, 2002).
2.2 A bivariate Markov-switching model
2.2.1 Setup of the model
Taking the above observations as a starting-point, I have recently investigated a
bivariate Markov-switching model in order to see how the pronounced swings of
Japan’s current account translated into similar swings of the yen. The remainder of
this section reports on the main ﬁndings of this study (Müller-Plantenberg, 2003b).
Section 3 will then extend the analysis by investigating in greater detail the role
played by the capital account in the determination of the Japanese exchange rate.
6In the paper mentioned, I ﬁnd that the Japanese current account, zt, and its
nominal effective exchange rate, st, are cointegrated and thus propose to model
their joint dynamics using a vector error correction model. However, the model is
modiﬁed in an important respect in that the intercept of the current account equa-
tion is allowed to switch between two states, or regimes, according to an unob-
servable Markov process. This is to take account of the recurrent structural breaks
in the current account variable, which is upward-trending in certain periods and
downward-trending in others. It is less obvious why the exchange rate should alter
its behaviour abruptly, except when fundamentals induce such shifts. Thus, the
exchange rate is modelled without a Markov-switching intercept.


































































Prob(Rt = 1jRt¡1 = 1) = p; Prob(Rt = 0jRt¡1 = 0) = q
In this representation, [d1;t;d2;t;d3;t]0 is a vector of seasonal dummies.
In period t, the system is in one of two regimes, 0 or 1, according to the unob-
served regime variable Rt. The variable Rt follows a Markov process with transi-
tion probabilities p and q. The regime affects the intercept of the current account
equation, which switches between a lower level, ¼0;2, and a higher level, ¼0;2+ºz.
The current account is drifting downward whenever the system is in regime 0; it
is drifting upward whenever the system is in regime 1. The transition probabilities
are assumed constant here in order to avoid a too complex setup, as is done in most
applications of Markov-switching models.
By collecting both variables into a vector yt = [st;zt]0, the model can be writ-
7ten as follows:
¢yt = ªdt + ¼0 + ºRt +
h¡1 X
i=1
¦t¡i¢yt¡i + ¦yt¡1 + "t
= ªdt + ¼0 + ºRt +
h¡1 X
i=1
¦t¡i¢yt¡i + ®¯0yt¡1 + "t
= ªdt + ¼0 + ºRt +
h¡1 X
i=1
¦t¡i¢yt¡i + ®´t¡1 + "t;
(2)
"t » i.i.d. N(0;§):
As equation (2) indicates, the matrix of long-run responses, ¦, is the product of
the feedback vector, ® = [®1;®2]0, and the cointegrating vector, ¯0 = [¯1;¯2]. The
vector ® is called feedback vector since it measures the system’s response to the
error from the long-run equilibrium relation. This error is given by ´t¡1 = ¯0yt¡1.
Since the vector error correction model contains a Markov-switching intercept
only in one of its equations, namely in that of the exchange rate fundamental,
statistical inference becomes a bit more involved. However, estimation is feasible
in a Bayesian context using a Gibbs-sampling procedure (for details, see Müller-
Plantenberg, 2003b). Here, we shall turn directly to the empirical results.
2.2.2 Empirical results
The model has been estimated for quarterly data from 1978Q1 to 2001Q1. Con-
sider Figure 3, which plots the estimated probability of being in regime 1. Periods
when the current account, and thus the exchange rate, are strengthening (regime 1),
are clearly distinguished from other periods when the current account is drifting
downward (regime 0).
To what extent have external imbalances contributed to exchange rate instabil-
ity in Japan? Of course, the model cannot give a ﬁnal answer to this question, but
it can provide us with some idea.
For this purpose, two sets of random series for the two variables were gen-
erated from the estimated model (with an identical sequence of random shocks
hitting the variables in both cases). The simulation period is sixty years, not taking
into account an initial warming-up period. In the ﬁrst simulation, artiﬁcial time
series for the current account and exchange rate were generated from the estimated
equations. In the second simulation, the regime-switching intercept of the current
account was set to its time-invariant average, which was evaluated on the basis of
the estimated values for ¼0;2, ºz, p and q. Thus, this exercise shows us what would
happen to the exchange rate if all structural breaks of its economic fundamental












Figure 3: Regime probabilities (informative prior). Probability of regime with high
current account intercept, using an informative prior for transition probabilities.
were eliminated. The results, which are shown in Figure 4, indicate that without
the long swings in the current account, exchange rate ﬂuctuations over the longer
term could have been much smoother.
2.3 The ﬂow market model revisited
Starting with the inﬂuential paper by Meese and Rogoff (1983), researchers have
routinely used out-of-sample forecasting contests to assess the validity of their ex-
change rate models. While it would be tempting follow this approach here, there
are also reasons why one might not want to do so.2
This paper follows a different route and takes instead a closer look at the bal-
ance of payments forces that impact currency values. As has been noted, the eco-
nomic motivation underlying the Markov-switching model analyzed here is closely
related to the ﬂow market model of the foreign exchange market. For a long time,
the conventional method for analyzing exchange rates was to monitor the ﬂow
supplies of, and demands for, foreign currencies in the foreign exchange markets.
2First, the bivariate Markov-switching model presented above provides insights into the possible
data-generating process underlying the movements of the Japanese current account and exchange
rate. It is not suggested, however, that this model will capture the behaviour of those two variables
into all future. For instance, while the current account exhibited large swings in the past—which
allowed us to study the exchange rate response to these swings—it may evolve in different ways in
the future. Second, a crucial test would be whether current account reversals help to predict changes
in the trend of the exchange rate. However, since the sample contains only a relatively small number
of current account swings, such a test would not be very reliable. Finally, while it is reasonable
for the purpose of estimation to assume ﬁxed transition probabilities, it is not clear how much this
simplifying assumption will hamper the model’s out-of-sample forecasting ability.
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Figure 4: Simulating exchange rate dynamics. Simulation of current account (top)
and nominal exchange rate (bottom) from the estimated model, over a period of 60 years.
Simulations of the original model with switching regimes (panels on the left), and of a
single-regime version of the model where the stochastic trend of the current account vari-
able is set to its estimated average (panels on the right).
Since supplies of, and demands for, foreign currencies are generated by current
account and capital account transactions, balance of payments ﬂows were used to
explain movements in exchange rates.
Originally developed in the 1930s and 1940s, the ﬂow market model fell out
of fashion among academic economists in the 1970s when monetary and portfolio
balance approaches to exchange rate determination came into vogue (Rosenberg,
1996). In addition to the advent of those modern exchange rate models (which,
paradoxically, soon failedin the early empirical tests by Meese and Rogoff(1983)),
a problem facing the ﬂow market model was that it was difﬁcult to link the be-
haviour of ﬂoating exchange rates to the movements of different components of
the balance of payments (Mussa, 1979).
Thirty years after the major industrial countries began to ﬂoat their exchange
rates, it might now be the right time for a reassessment of the ﬂow market model
(on which, as should be pointed out, market participants nowadays still rely in their
analysis of exchange rate behaviour). Japan is a particularly interesting case to
study: First, current account movements have been very large. Second, the country
began to liberalize its capital account relatively late, namely in the late 1970s and
the 1980s; for this reason, among others, speculative capital ﬂows, in particular
equity ﬂows, have played less of a role for the exchange rate in Japan than, say, in
the United States. And ﬁnally, Japan has tended to invest large parts of its current
account surpluses in debt securities abroad (see Figure 5).










Both variables in US-$. Debt securities balance as a moving average with two leads and
lags. Period from 1977Q3 to 1999Q2. Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF).
The large share of the debt securities balance in Japan’s capital account is of
great advantage as it enables us to determine the cash ﬂow associated with the ﬂow
ofdebtsecuritiesto andfromJapan. Thenextsectionwillmeasurethesecashﬂows
and will show that the ﬂows of payments resulting from the current account and the
debt securities balance together can already explain a large part of the movements
of the yen over the years.
3 Simulating currency ﬂows
3.1 A cash ﬂow model
This section attempts to simulate the ﬂows of payments between Japan and the
rest of the world. For this purpose, the following model has been set up. Let
zt denote the current account, dt the debt securities balance and ct the ﬂow of
cross-border payments, or cash ﬂow (more speciﬁcally, the cash ﬂow that arises
from transactions that are recorded in the current account and the debt securities
balance). Suppose that current account transactions in a given period are either











where debt issued in period t is indexed by its maturity and denoted as di
t, with
i = 1;2;:::;1. Debt maturity is deﬁned here as the actual, or ex-post, maturity.
For example, if foreign debt held by Japanese investors has a 1-year maturity and
is rolled over twice, the actual maturity is taken to be 3 years.
Consequently, cash payments in any given period have to be made for part of















t represents that part of the cash ﬂow in period t that results from debt
issued i periods ago. It follows from equations (3) and (4) that the overall cash













The debt balance, dt, is the sum of the debt incurred in period t, less all debt




























¹i and ®j = ¹j; for j = 1;2;:::: (8)
L is the lag operator and ®(L) = ®0 + ®1L1 + ®2L2 + :::
The problem is that the cash ﬂow variable, ct, is not directly observed. The
reason is that payment ﬂows across international borders do not enter the balance
of payments as a separate item. Instead, they enter various subcomponents. For ex-
ample, some cash ﬂows, such as changes in bank balances, appear in the "other in-
vestment" item in the ﬁnancial account. However, "other investment" also includes
trade credits and loans, thus making it difﬁcult to infer cash ﬂow movements from
the movements of the "other investment" balance.
With knowledge of ¹i, i = 0;1;:::, however, ct can be indirectly obtained
from equation (5). For i = 1;2;:::, the parameters ¹i coincide with the parameters
®i of the inﬁnite lag polynomial in equation (7).
The current account, zt, and the debt balance, dt, can theoretically ﬂuctuate
independently over time, as long as the gap between the two is made up by move-
ments in other components of the capital account. Figure 5 shows, however, that
both the current account and the debt securities balance have moved quite closely
together over time. This suggests that other balance of payment components can-
celled each other out, at least roughly; thus, to keep things simple, they are not
further considered here.
AugmentedDickey-Fullertests(notreported)showthatthenullhypothesisofa
unit root cannot be rejected for zt, nor for dt. While individually I(1), the Japanese
current account and debt securities balance appear to be cointegrated, that is, a
linear combination of both variables exists that is I(0). To test for cointegration,
Johansen’s (1988) procedure is applied, and it is found that the null hypothesis of
no cointegration cannot be rejected at the 1% signiﬁcance level (see Table 1).
H0 HA Trace test p-value
r = 0 r > 0 22.750 [0.003] **
r · 1 r > 1 2.2928 [0.130]
Table 1: Testing for cointegration. Testing for the number of distinct cointe-
grating vectors, using 2 lags. Double asterisks (**) mark signiﬁcance at the 1%
level.
Based on these results, the relationship between the two balance of payments
13components can be modelled as an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model:






¯izt¡i + "t; "t » N(0;¾2): (9)
Theinﬁnitelagpolynomialinequation(7)canthenbeobtainedbydividingthedis-





where °(L) = 1¡°1L¡°2L2 ¡:::¡°pLp and ¯(L) = ¯0 +¯1L+:::+¯qLq.
Quarterly data from 1977 to 2002 were used in the estimation. The data was
taken from the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics. The lag lengths, p and q, in
the ARDL model were both set to 3.
3.2 Simulation results
The values of ct were now simulated, based on equations (5), (8) and (10). Note
that we do not have an estimate of ¹0. The solution adopted here is to simply set
it equal to ®0, suggesting that current accounts are ﬁnanced to one half by direct
cash payments, to the other half by debt. This is but a convenient assumption, but
it was found that raising ¹0 above or below this value did not affect the results too
much.
Quarterly data on the Japanese current account from 1968Q1 to 1999Q4 were
used in the simulation; these had previously been constructed from a biannual cur-
rent account series contained in the OECD’s Economic Outlook database. Only
the ﬁrst 8 lags of the polynomial ®(L) were used for the simulation, which helped
to avoid loosing too many observations for the simulation.
The outcome of the simulation is shown in Figure 6. The movements of the
internationalﬂowsofpaymentsacrossJapan’sborderscoincideremarkablyclosely
with those of the Japanese exchange rate. The mean lag of ®(L), which indicates
the average maturity of foreign debt, is 1.653 quarters. The ﬁgure also plots net
sales of Japanese reserve assets, which appear relatively small compared with the
aggregate cash ﬂow facing the Japanese economy.
4 Japan’s economic stagnation
If the proposition underlying the previous two sections is correct—namely, that the
yen’s nominal exchange rate was, by and large, driven by trade and capital ﬂows
over the years—what does this imply for the analysis of Japan’s current economic
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Figure 6: Japan’s imbalance of payments. Simulated net international payments to
Japan, as an indicator of yen order ﬂow, shown together with net sales of reserves (top
panel, in trillions of yen, reserve sales drawn as index bars), and nominal effective ex-
changerate(bottompanel, in logarithms). Source: EconomicOutlook (OECD),IFS (IMF),
own calculations.
problems? And what should we think of proposals to devalue the yen to revive the
Japanese economy?
4.1 The downside of success
4.1.1 A hard landing
Japan has for a long time been admired across the globe for its economic perfor-
mance, in particular for its international competitiveness and export strength. The
traditionally high saving rate helped Japan to become the largest creditor nation in
the world. The unhappy end of this success story is now evident to everyone. The
analysis of this paper can shed some light on where the downside of success lies.
This paper suggests that, notwithstanding other factors, Japan’s large and sus-
tained current account surpluses are at the root of its current economic problems.
By pushing up the yen very strongly over decades, they have contributed to the
deﬂationary pressures, from which the economy has been suffering from for quite
some time.
Of course, removing the external surplus would ﬁx the problem according to
the logic applied here. Yet the current account is not a policy variable, and at any
rate a strong demand for Japanese exports seems to provide a welcome stimulus
for the economy at this moment. Policy-makers naturally look for other kinds of
remedies, namely for measures they can control (at least in principle).
154.1.2 What scope for monetary policy?
Consider monetary policy. With interest rates hitting zero, the Bank of Japan’s only
way to induce money growth is to keep printing money. But the bank has already
bought government bonds, and thus created money, on a large scale. The monetary
base has increased at an annual rate of almost 25% over the past two years (The
Economist, 19 June 2003). Yet this has not led to higher growth in broad money.
Instead, bank lending has continued to fall. Banks are reluctant to lend, as they are
already piled up with bad loans. Moreover, indebted ﬁrms are unwilling to borrow
in the present deﬂationary environment.
An equally important question is whether monetary policy has been too strict
prior to the crisis, and thus to what extent it may have been contributing to the
overly strong yen. This paper cannot give a detailed answer to this question. How-
ever, an examination of the data suggests that money growth in Japan was actually
quite strong in comparison with other countries. According to the OECD’s Eco-
nomic Outlook, the money stock in Japan grew at an annual average of 9.1% from
1970 to 2000, compared with 7.3% and 7.8% in the United States and Germany,
respectively. For comparison, the volume of GDP in Japan rose on average by
3.2% per year, whereas in the US and Germany, it increased by 2.9% and 2.7%,
respectively.
There is an interesting parallel to currency crises. In the aftermath of such
crises, it is tempting to put the blame on ﬁscal and monetary policies for being too
loose. Yet during the currency crises of the 1990s, the macroeconomic policies
prior to the crises had been considered sound in many of the countries affected.
Instead, it has often been sharp withdrawals of foreign funds after long periods of
foreign lending that made currencies collapse. There is thus a lesson for Japan.
When external imbalances start to shift the relative demand for national monies, it
can be just as hard to defend a currency as to keep it from rising.
4.2 Devalue the yen?
Many economists advocate a big depreciation of the yen through intervention in
the foreign exchange markets in the current situation (see, for example, Svensson,
2001). Japanese prices have been falling since 1995, and devaluation is viewed
by many as one of the few policy tools left to ﬁght deﬂation. First, a cheaper
yen would boost exports, and this would stimulate the economy. Second, through
higher import prices, it would presumably push up inﬂation, stimulating consump-
tion and investment and decreasing the real value of debt in the economy. However,
given that Japan’s imports account for only 10% of GDP, an ordinary devaluation
wouldn’t sufﬁce—it would have to be substantial.
16The rest of this section will address two questions: Is a devaluation of the yen
feasible? How much would it help, or might it even be harmful?
4.2.1 Magnitude of intervention
Using foreign exchange intervention to lower the yen seems straightforward. All
there is to do for the Japanese authorities is to print large amounts of yen to buy
dollar bonds. So isn’t this the point where the parallels with currency crises end?
When a central bank tries to support a currency, it quickly runs out of reserves. In
Japan, however, it would appear that intervention does not face similar limitations.
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Figure 7: Japan’s share of world reserves. Japan’s share of total reserves of all coun-
tries, plotted alongside the industrial countries’ share of world-wide reserves (monthly
data, excluding gold reserves). Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF).
Yet the facts are that Japan has been acquiring reserves on an unprecedented
scale in recent years. What’s more, Japan’s share of all reserves held world-wide
has risen substantially since 1993, as can be seen from Figure 7. Interestingly,
reserve holdings by other industrial countries have declined sharply over the same
period. Out of industrial countries’ reserves, Japan now holds a share of 45.6%
(2001M11), up from only 12.0% nine years back (1992M9).
In the past, appreciations of the yen have almost always been associated with
increases in reserves. Yet even large interventions do not appear to have helped
much to prevent the yen from rising. From the empirical analysis in this paper, it
seemsclearwhy. ConsideroncemoreFigure6, whichplotsthesimulatedcashﬂow
together with the changes in Japanese reserves. The impression is that intervention
has seldom been more than a small fraction of the economy-wide payments across
the border. It is therefore not surprising that their impact should have been limited.
17What do the actual market participants think? Cheung and Wong (2000) have
recently carried out a survey of practitioners in the interbank foreign exchange
markets of Hong Kong, Tokyo and Singapore. They ﬁnd that the participants in
the Tokyo market "have the most pessimistic views on intervention in terms of
restoring equilibrium values, being conducted at the right moment, and achieving
the goal". Of the respondents in the Tokyo market, 68.1% did not think that cen-
tral bank intervention achieved its goal, whereas in the Hong Kong and Singapore
markets, 60.8% and 58.7%, respectively, believed that it did.
4.2.2 Undesired effects
When Japan hit an export boom in the past, it usually sent the inﬂowing proceeds
abroad straightaway, for example by investing in US Treasury bonds. It was not
until the foreign debt became due that the exchange rate appreciated. This is what
needs to be kept in mind when contemplating a large-scale intervention to bring
downtheyen. Interventionneedstobeperpetuatedifitistobeeffective; otherwise,
interest and amortisation payments will soon undo its initial effects.
There is also another potential "boomerang" effect that could take effect after
a devaluation and that one needs to take into account. If efforts to devalue the yen
succeed, this may spur exports and thus create another wave of incoming cash ﬂow.
The relationship between the real exchange rate and current account is not a simple
one for Japan—after all, its current account surplus has kept rising despite the long-
term appreciation of the yen. However, Müller-Plantenberg (2003a) has shown that
large real exchange rate changes did tend to bring about reversals of the temporary
trends of the current account (rather than its level). Thus once devaluation succeeds
to create another export boom, an appreciation of the yen might soon follow. It
would not have to come immediately—as we know by now. But it would come.
5 Conclusions
Overalongperiodoftime, theJapaneseexchangeratehasfollowedthemovements
of the current account quite closely. Long swings in the current account translated
into similar swings in the exchange rate. In general, export booms pushed up the
yen, while slumps in net exports made it fall. However, it often took some time—
usually up to one or two years—until the exchange rate had fully adjusted.
This paper suggests that ﬂows of international payments between Japan and
the rest of the world have been a crucial driving force behind the yen. Importantly,
these ﬂows are related to the balance of payments. For instance, current account
transactions that have to be paid for straight away lead to an instantaneous ﬂow of
18cash, whereas debt-ﬁnanced transactions can give rise to a ﬂow of payments that is
spread-out over time.
Japan, the world’s largest creditor, has used the proceeds of its current account
surpluses primarily to lend abroad, investing heavily in foreign debt securities.
Thispapershowshowitispossibletoestimatethematuritystructureofthislending
basedontheinformationcontainedinthecurrentaccountanddebtbalances. Ituses
the maturity structure of foreign lending to simulate international payment ﬂows
and shows that their movements are remarkably similar to those of the Japanese
exchange rate.
These ﬁndings lead directly to the question of whether the present economic
crisis in Japan could have been averted or whether something can be done to over-
come it. Here, the answer is a cautious one. It is pointed out that the strong yen
and the deﬂationary pressure to which it contributed are not necessarily the result
of bad policy-making. A parallel is drawn to experiences in the 1990s when coun-
tries were hit by currency crises even though they had, in more than one instance,
followed sound ﬁscal and monetary policies. Likewise, it is found that the large-
scale acquisition of reserves is unlikely to ﬁx the problem. Japan has, as a matter
of fact, amassed foreign exchange reserves on an unprecedented scale over recent
years.
Going beyond Japan, the ﬁndings of this paper point to a number of potential
economic fallacies. They concern fundamental questions such as whether the real
exchange rate is driven by the nominal exchange rate, particularly at longer hori-
zons, or vice versa; whether and how exchange rates are linked to economic fun-
damentals (Meese and Rogoff, 1983); or why it is that deviations from purchasing-
power parity are so large and persistent (Rogoff, 1996).
In recent decades, the world has witnessed an ever greater integration of its
national economies and ﬁnancial markets. At the same time, industrial countries
havereducedtheirinﬂationratesandcommittedthemselvestoinﬂationlevelsclose
to zero. A conclusion from this paper is that large external imbalances can have
a strong and persistent impact on the exchange rates of different monies. Differ-
ences in inﬂation rates are both an outcome of this—as a result of the pass-through
of exchange rates on import prices—and a requirement to overcome lasting real
exchange rate misalignments. Thus Japan’s inﬂation rate has stayed almost two
percent below the weighted inﬂation rate of its trading partners for many years.
While low international inﬂation rates are widely welcomed, one should not over-
look that they have likely contributed to Japan’s present condition, which is marked
by deﬂation and stagnation.
19Appendices
A Data
The data used in this paper were taken from the Balance of Payments Statistics and




and Ooms, 2001), and PcFiml (see Doornik and Henry, 1997). The programs are
available from the author upon request.
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